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I thank Lisa Barrett for the stimulating and comprehensive paper explaining her theory 
of emotion.  In what follows I will summarize what I take to be our points of agreement, 
my confusions, and suggestions for how to move forward. 
 
Where we agree (I think).  I agree that our current criteria for categorizing emotions 
need to be improved, and that words like “anger, fear” etc. need revision.  Constructed 
Emotion Theory seems to go further than this, however, and at least at times advocates 
an apparent radical relativism (“Emotion categories are as real as any other conceptual 
categories that require a human perceiver for existence, such as “money””), with which I 
disagree (see below).  However, it may be that this relativism is intended only towards 
specific emotion categories, not to dimensions of emotion and not to emotion 
generically, which would bring us closer together. 
 Surely, we cannot choose to apply the term “emotion” to just anything, otherwise 
our own papers on emotion might or might not be about emotion (or might be about 
emotion if read in America, but about something else if read in Europe).  I think, then, 
that Lisa’s paper is making a substantive and important point about our need to have 
better criteria for identifying a state as an emotion -- but not proposing that we don’t 
need criteria at all or can make up any; and with this I agree.   
 I agree with the paper’s discussions of neural reuse, predictive coding, and 
dynamic routing; all these are current theories about brain function for which there is 
considerable support.  I also agree that the brain makes predictions even before birth, 
since there must be innate priors of some sort (for what it’s worth, I think there are 
innate emotions, but not innate concepts).  So, although one can quibble about details, I 
broadly agree with the gist of the paper’s discussion about brain function.  
 I largely agree with the entries in Table 2 that seem to be a key ingredient for the 
Theory of Constructed Emotion (but I mostly don’t endorse the claims of Table 1, not 
necessarily because the entries are incorrect, but because they seem far too 
inconclusive at this stage), and I agree that any specific emotion (e.g., fear) does not 
arise from the activity of a single dedicated set of neurons (a view I frankly don’t even 
understand).  Finally, I agree with the facts described about patients with amygdala 
damage.   
 The section, “Taking a network perspective,” puts forth several interesting 
hypotheses about the functions of resting-state networks.  I agree that brain function 
depends on distributed networks, and that the current set of networks from resting-state 
data likely make important contributions to many cognitive functions, but I don’t see this 
as requiring us to neglect more classical units of analysis such as specific 
neuroanatomical structures and the systems in which they participate.  I think Lisa 
would also agree with this: so, there are a variety of choices available for how you want 
to study the brain at the systems level: some might involve resting-state networks, some 
specific neuroanatomical structures or neuronal populations with them, and none are 
mutually exclusive. 
 
Where I am confused.  I said earlier that I broadly agree with what Lisa’s paper says 
about brain function (predictive coding, neural reuse, degeneracy, etc.).  On the other 
hand these features are (a) not at all specific to emotions and (b) not exclusive 
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(predictive coding is not everywhere; many functions show degenerative mappings to 
neuroanatomy, but not all).  But I was confused about the relevance of all this, since 
nowhere in the paper was I able to actually find any criteria for what counts as an 
emotion.    
 I find many of the interesting claims in the paper complex to evaluate because I 
am unclear either about what the terms mean, or about the reasoning (or both).  Here 
are two quotes that could be useful seed points for future discussion: 
 “In emotion research, degeneracy means that instances of an emotion (e.g., fear) 
are created by multiple spatiotemporal patterns in varying populations of neurons. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that all instances of an emotion category share a set of core 
features.”  I agree with the first sentence, but don’t understand how the second follows.  
This may be because I am unclear on what “core features” means; the examples given 
in the paper seem obviously wrong.  In my view, the “core features” are functional 
features (perhaps along the lines of the ones listed in Table 2 of my original paper). 
 “What is a brain for? A brain did not evolve for rationality, happiness, or accurate 
perception. All brains accomplish the same core task ... to efficiently ensure resources... 
so that an animal can grow, survive, and reproduce.” I think this conflates proximal and 
distal mechanisms (and I have the same reaction when Joe LeDoux writes of “survival 
circuits”).  Yes, everything evolved, and some of that evolution is directed towards 
adaptations for survival and reproduction.  But the aggregate long-term adaptive 
pressure towards survival and reproduction is mediated by many constrained and more 
proximal mechanisms.  So I would disagree that emotions function “for survival”.  They 
are one piece, amongst many others, that, in part, in a whole organism, in a certain 
environment, generally aid survival.  But their proximal function has much more specific, 
and more short-sighted goals: specific functions, for example of the sort that 
evolutionary psychology hypothesizes.  We need to understand those specific functions 
and map them onto specific emotions, not erase their boundaries by saying they all help 
survival. 
 A section that was tough going for me was the one titled, “The computational 
architecture of the brain is a conceptual system plus pattern generators,” because I 
don’t understand Lisa’s concept of a concept.  For instance, the claim that, “when the 
internal model creates an emotion concept, the result is an instance of emotion”, would 
run counter to my view.  As I was at pains to point out in my original paper, emotion 
concepts are not emotions.  While the term “concept” traditionally refers to the mental 
representations by which we think about something (i.e., semantic knowledge), Lisa’s 
usage appears to be broader.  If it means something like “all the neuronal activity 
engaged in an emotion state”, then of course I would agree that emotions are concepts 
in this sense-- but I am unclear on what such a redefinition of the term “concept” would 
actually elucidate.  I end up knowing exactly what I did before:  as implemented in the 
human brain, emotion states typically involve predictions and degeneracy and 
perceptual processes and motor processes and a whole lot more.   
The way forward.  I appreciate what I think the Theory of Constructed Emotion is trying 
to achieve.  If I understand it right, the big-picture motivation is twofold:  (1) to forge a 
more holistic, distributed, dynamic view of how emotions are generated in the brain, and 
(2) to free us from traditional categories of thinking about emotions (like the terms for 
basic emotions).  
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 I am very sympathetic with #2, but I have doubts that #1 is the way to do it.  I 
agree that traditional emotion categories need revision, or even elimination in some 
cases, and of course I agree that phrenological ways of thinking about brain function as 
“in” specific regions isn’t how the brain works.  But I nonetheless think that we DO need 
categories of emotions (and/or dimensions), and we DO need to make distinctions 
between brain systems and their functions.  I have the same concern about various 
versions of enactive/situated cognition: the fact that many of the traditional distinctions 
draw the wrong boundaries does not mean we should get rid of distinctions and aim 
towards some conglomerate holism.  We should just aim to redraw the boundaries.  If 
anything, I think we need more distinctions and a more fine-grained taxonomy, not 
fewer.   But most importantly, I disagree that one can begin “......with the structure and 
function of the brain, and from there deduce what the biological basis of emotions might 
be.”  I think this is squarely impossible, because I think you absolutely need to begin 
with observation of behavior and derive your categories from there.   
 I worry about radical versions of relativism that see emotion terms as social 
constructs like money.  In my view, emotions are perfectly objective in the following 
formal sense: the statement, e.g., “Ralph is in a state of fear”, is true or false 
independently of whether I believe it to be true or false.  I could be wrong about my own 
emotion state.  Science requires objectivity, and if anybody were free to use the word 
“fear” as they chose, we could not have a science of emotion. 
 In terms of how best to derive the emotion categories that a science of emotion 
requires, I disagree that, “... it makes no sense to elevate categories for anger, sadness, 
fear, disgust and happiness to a common ethological framework for comparing humans 
with other animals, when there is ample evidence from linguistics, anthropology and 
psychology that these categories do not offer a robust, universal framework .....”  I 
simply think we should take our definition of these emotion categories from biology and 
ethology.  
 There are two domains I omitted in my original paper that Lisa’s paper 
acknowledges and that indeed need much more discussion.  One is interoception, the 
second is social communication.  It is with respect to the latter that I suspect the Theory 
of Constructed Emotion may be particularly important, since it is indeed true that 
emotional displays have been co-opted by, and serve a rich and complex role, in social 
communication -- which is highly variable and flexible.  It is here that affective 
neuroscience would transition to social neuroscience and, as with all distinctions, I think 
this one too is an important one to keep in mind. 
 The theme of our invited debate was to give our view on how we think 
neuroscience should study emotion.  For me, that is in part a very practical question: 
what criteria and terms can we agree upon, and what specific framework can we 
provide for those wanting to do experiments in affective neuroscience. Towards that 
end, I am grateful for this debate. 
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